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Re-defining	the	balance	of	power	in	Lebanon:	Sunni	and	Shiites	communities	transformations,		the	regional	context	and	the	Arab	uprisings			Rosita	Di	Peri	Università	degli	Studi	di	Torino	–	Torino					 	 Dad,	are	we	Sunnis	or	Shiites?	No	sweetheart	we	are	Lebanese	Dad,	seriously	what	are	we?	My	Son..	I	am	Sunni	and	your	mom	is	Shiite	and	you	were	baptized	at	a	Catholic	church	Your	sister	is	Maronite,	like	her	husband	and	your	brother	is	going	to	marry	a	Druze	Dad,	did	you	do	that	for	national	unity?	No	my	son,	I	did	this	so	that	whatever	happens	one	of	us	will	still	be	able	to	go	out	and	buy	a	loaf	of	bread		 	 Abstract	 The paper analyzes the transformations occurred in the two most active and 
relevant communities in Lebanon after the end of the civil war, namely the Sunni and the Shiites, in 
the light of Arab uprisings and of the changes in the regional balance of power. If the meta-narrative 
of the ‘sectarianization’ of the Middle East, especially after 2011, has powered the interpretation of 
the regional events as marked by the struggle between Sunni and Shiites, the analysis of the 
transformations of the above mentioned communities in Lebanon and of their impact on the internal 
and external level, provides one of the best examples against this simplistic representation: the 
sectarian contraposition is deeply rooted in Lebanon, a pars constituent of its system, but, despite 
the rhetoric, both communities tend to have more pragmatic and accommodating attitudes instead of 
exacerbating sectarian confrontation as the afore-mentioned meta-narrative tends to impose. While 
it is true that each community has witnessed the radicalization of certain positions and that, over the 
years, major changes are taking place, those have been fuelled by the meta-narrative that is 
emerging at the regional level and not by a desire to bring the country to the brink of the abyss. 		Keywords:	Lebanon,	Balance	of	Power,	Sunni	ad	Shiites,	Arab	Uprisings,	Confessionalism.			The	 Arab	 uprisings	 have	 fueled	 intense	 debate	 among	 scholars	 of	 the	 Middle	 East	 and,	 in	general,	of	political	science	and	international	relations.	The	wave	of	uprisings	that	shook	the	region,	which	 led	 to	 the	 ‘death’	 of	 some	 long-time	 authoritarian	 leaders,	 has	 provided	 new	stimulus	to	the	interpretation	of	events	in	this	area,	until	now	viewed	through	the	paradigm	of	the	authoritarianism	resilience.1	Furthermore,	the	uprisings	pave	the	way	to	a	series	of	new	interpretations	of	the	regional	balance	of	power.		In	this	regard,	before	the	outbreak	of	the	uprisings,	one	of	the	best-known	theories	was	one	that	emphasizes	the	existence	of	an	internal	split	in	the	Middle	East	following	the	division	between	Sunnis	and	Shiites	with	a	 focus	on	 the	 identity	element	(Nasr	2006;	Helfont	2009;	Cole	2006).	Another	field	of	analysis,	adopting	a	constructivist	approach,	had	underlined	the	reconstitution	of	renewed	pan-Arabism	based	on	new	transnational	consciousness	fuelled	by																																																									1	 On	 the	 authoritarianism	 resilience	 in	 the	 Arab	world,	 the	 debate	 is	 intensive.	 See,	 among	 others,	 Anderson	(2006)	and	Heydemann	(2007).	The	Arab	uprisings	propel	such	debate,	also	with	diverging	interpretations.	On	this	last	point,	see,	among	others,	the	Special	Issue	on	Mediterranean	Politics	(17,	2,	2012)	and,	in	particular,	the	Introduction	by	Cavatorta	and	Pace	(2012)	as	well	as	Volpi	(2012),	Heydemann	and	Leenders	(2011).		
  
new	Arab	media	(El-Nawawy	and	Iskander	2002;	Valeriani	2005;	Lynch	2006;	Pintak	2009).2	Alternatively,	on	the	contrary,	other	scholars	have	advanced	the	hypothesis	to	be	compared	with	 the	 presence	 of	 a	 ‘post	 Arab’	 Middle	 East	 (Phillips	 2014)	 with	most	 relations	 among	Middle	Eastern	States,	instead	of	inter-Arab	relations,	increasingly	dependent	on	those	of	non-Arab	States	(Iran,	Turkey,	 Israel)	(Susser	2007;	Noble	2008).	Other	 interpretations,	such	as	those	by	Valbjørn	and	Bank,	used	patterns	of	analysis	borrowed	from	the	past,	such	as	that	of	the	 ‘Arab	 Cold	War,’	 amending	 them	 to	 the	 region’s	 new	 situation	 following	 the	 2003	 U.S.	invasion	of	Iraq	(Valbjørn	and	Bank	2012).	Their	argument,	using	Malcolm	Kerr’s	1965	book	The	Arab	 Cold	War,	 1958-1964	 as	 a	 starting	 point,	would	 seek	 to	 employ	 the	 prism	of	 the	realist	 interpretation	proposed	by	Kerr,	rearranging	it	to	the	current	situation.	Valbjørn	and	Bank	argue	that	dynamics	among	the	Arab	states	would	be	characterized	by	a	new	dimension	of	Arab	unity	not	at	the	state	level	but	at	the	society	level	(Valbjørn	and	Bank	2007).	In	other	words,	they	argue	that,	despite	appearances,	in	today’s	Middle	Eastern	policy	it	would	not	be	sectarian	 or	 ethnic	 divisions	 that	 would	 prevail,	 such	 as	 the	 supposed	 growing	 rivalry	between	 Shiites	 and	 Sunni,	 but	 dynamics	more	 closely	 related	 to	 the	 classical	 raison	 d’état	that	would	 fit	 into	a	 ‘Westphalian	 type	of	narrative,’	whereby	 the	particular	 interests	of	 the	states	would	win	out.	In	Valbjørn	and	Bank’s	view,	an	interesting	example	of	such	dynamics	could	be	 seen	 in	 the	behavior	of	 certain	Arab	countries	during	 the	war	between	Ḥizb	Allāh	and	Israel	in	2006.	According	to	the	two	scholars,	the	deployment	of	Saudi	Arabia,	Jordan	and	Egypt	 against	 the	 action	 of	Ḥizb	Allāh	would	 not	 be	 dictated,	 as	many	 analysts	 argue,	 by	 a	Sunni-Shiite	 divide,	 but	 by	 the	 start	 of	what	 Valbjørn	 and	Bank	 define	 as	 a	 ‘new	Arab	 cold	war,’	 that	 is,	 a	 realignment	 of	Middle	Eastern	 states	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 a	 renewed	 struggle	 for	leadership	in	the	region.	In	this	paper,	we	will	move	in	the	direction	of	the	aforementioned	‘Westphalian	narrative’	(Gause	 2007).	 In	 reconfiguring	 the	 regional	 order	 in	 the	 wake	 of	 the	 Arab	 revolts,	 the	relations	 that	 are	 being	 formed	 among	 the	 various	Middle	 Eastern	 countries	 appear	 to	 be	characterized	by	a	form	of	competition,	in	which	each	nation	vies	for	their	accreditation	or	re-accreditation	as	a	hegemonic	power	at	the	regional	level	(Salloukh	2013).3	If	the	identitarian	narrative	 is	 used	 heavily	 to	 represent	 the	 Middle	 Eastern	 region	 as	 characterized	 by	 a	redefinition	 of	 alliances	 that	 would	 see	 a	 Sunni	 bloc	 (Saudi	 Arabia,	 Egypt,	 Qaṭar)	 lined	 up	against	the	so-called	‘axis	of	resistance,’	in	part	coinciding	with	a	Shiite	bloc	(Iran,	Syria,	Ḥizb	Allāh	and	Ḥamās)4,	then	the	argument	I	am	putting	forward	here	is	that	this	opposite	thesis	–the	 so-called	 sectarianization	 of	 the	 Middle	 East	 –	 should	 be	 considered	 as	 the	 new	 all-encompassing	 meta-narrative	 that	 is	 replacing	 transnational	 unifying	 themes	 (such	 as	 the	Palestinian	 cause	 and	 the	 fight	 against	 Israel	 or,	 more	 broadly,	 pan-Arabism	 and	 pan-Islamism)	 by	 proposing	 a	 sort	 of	 new	 pan-Islamism	 based	 on	 sectarian	 basis	 which	 I	 call	“sectarian	pan-Islamism”.	Whereas,	 in	 the	 past,	 transnational	 unifying	 themes	 or	 ideologies	led	 the	 Arab	 states	 to	 ongoing	 clashes	 between	 transnational	 and	 national	 aspirations	(Barnett	1995:	484–86),	 today,	according	to	this	new	dominant	meta-narrative,	 this	tension	has	 been	 transformed	 in	 a	 prevalence	 of	 the	 former	 over	 the	 latter.	 In	 this	 paper,	 on	 the	contrary,	it	is	argued	that	national	politics	play	an	important	role	in	redefining	the	geopolitical	balance	of	power	in	the	region.	If	the	Arab	uprisings	have	produced	a	tangible	result,	it	must	be	 found	 in	 the	 renewed	 attention	 that	 the	 political	 strategies	 of	 the	 regional	 states	 have	acquired	 in	 the	 international	arena,	which	has	also	been	accompanied	by	 the	decline	of	 the	interests	of	the	Western	countries	on	the	Middle	East,	as	the	American	withdrawal	from	Iraq	(and	 soon	 also	 from	 Afghanistan)	 has	 demonstrated	 (Malmvig	 2013),	 but	 also	 by	 the																																																									2	On	the	role	of	Ḥizb	Allāh	and	its	media	apparatus,	see	Lamloum	(2009).	3	This	thesis	was	pointed	out	by	several	scholars,	see,	in	particular,	Salloukh	(2013).	4	 On	 the	 sectarianization	 of	 Middle	 Eastern	 politics	 see,	 among	 others,	 Malmvig	 (2013),	 Abdo	 (2013)	 and	Heydemann	(2013).	
  
marginalization	 of	 those	 transnational	 issues	 (such	 as	 the	 Palestinian	 cause),	 which	 had	contributed	 towards	 fuelling	 the	 transnational	 pan-Arabist	 ideology	 (Norton	 2013).	 This	element	 also	 appears	 to	 have	 been	 strengthened,	 despite	 appearances,	 by	 the	 insignificant	role	played	by	the	Arab	League.5	With	this	 framework	in	mind,	Lebanon	and	the	changes	that	are	taking	place	there	(not	only	 as	 a	direct	 and	 indirect	 consequence	of	 the	Arab	uprisings	 and	 the	Syrian	 crisis)	 offer	interesting	insights	to	understand	better	the	regional	politics	and	alterations	in	balances	and	alliances.	Internal/external	tensions	have	always	characterized	the	politics	of	the	“country	of	the	Cedars”:	since	before	independence,	each	community	had	an	external	“patron”	to	turn	to	when	 applying	 for	 funding	 and/or	 political	 support.	While	 in	 the	 past	 it	was	 the	 European	powers	 and	 then	 the	Western	 powers	 that	 had	 this	 role,	 in	more	 recent	 times	 the	 various	“patrons”	are	found	in	individual	states	of	the	region.	This	change	in	perspective	provides	an	interesting	 point	 of	 view	 in	 understanding	 how	 Lebanon,	 historically	 a	 kaleidoscope	 of	regional	diversity,	is	one	of	the	pivots	upon	which	regional	interests	and	balance	of	power	are	centred	and	rotate.		Consequently	 this	 paper	 intends	 to	 use	 Lebanon	 as	 a	 mirror	 of	 regional	 changes.	 The	changes	 in	 the	 country’s	 confessional	 balances	 have	 become	 even	 more	 relevant	 after	 the	Syrian	crisis,	showing	how	Lebanon	presents,	within	it,	the	full	spectrum	of	relationships	that	can	 be	 found	 at	 the	 regional	 level.	 Consequently,	 the	 modification	 of	 the	 communitarian	arrangements	may	be	one	way	of	re-reading	the	balance	of	power	at	the	regional	level.6	The	focus	 of	 this	 paper	 will	 be	 on	 the	 Lebanese	 Sunni	 and	 the	 Shi’a	 communities.	 For	 several	reasons,	but	 in	particular	because	the	split	between	Sunni	and	Shiites,	as	we	have	seen,	this	became	one	of	the	most	robust	meta-narratives	used	to	describe	the	current	situation	at	the	regional	 level.	Consequently,	 the	paper	will	explore	how	this	narrative	 is	 fuelled	in	Lebanon	and	how	fundamental	this	is	in	understanding	the	regional	situation.		The	Sunni	community,	represented	by	the	coalition	government	of	14	March,	is	suffering	a	process	of	marginalization	that	has	led,	on	the	one	hand,	to	the	marginalization	of	its	leader	Saʿd	Ḥarīrī	 and,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 a	 strengthening	 of	 some	Salafist	movements,	which	put	forward	 a	 binary	 vision	 interpreting	 Lebanese	 politics	 as	 a	 struggle	 between	 Sunnis	 and	Shiites.	 The	 Shiite	 community,	 whose	 role	 (with	 the	 rise	 of	 Ḥizb	 Allāh),	 has	 become	increasingly	strategic,	is	suffering	legitimacy	turmoil	after	the	escalation	of	the	crisis	in	Syria	and	the	support	provided	by	the	General	Secretary	of	the	Party,	Ḥasan	Naṣrallāh,	to	Asad.	This	threatened	to	negate	the	claim	of	trans-confessionalism	to	which	this	party	has	aspired	since	its	creation.	If	the	polarization	of	the	confessional	positions	within	the	Lebanese	political	spectrum	is	beyond	question,	it	should	be	remembered	that	in	the	past,	however,	this	“sectarian	tension”	was	partly	aimed	at	keeping	alive	the	consociational	system.7	The	polarization,	at	 least	until	the	explosion	of	the	Syrian	crisis,	never	relied	on	physical	confrontation	among	the	different	communities,	 except	 in	 sporadic	 cases,	 and	 the	 “aggregating	 factors”,	 although	 difficult,	prevailed	 over	 the	 disruptive	 ones.	 However,	 the	 Sunni	 anti-Shiite	 rhetoric	 (spread	 also	within	 the	 Maronite	 community)	 is	 likely	 to	 move	 the	 plane	 of	 comparison	 among	 the																																																									5	For	an	historical	view,	see	Dakhlallah	(2012).	Some	scholars	argue,	however,	that,	although	weak,	institutions	such	as	the	Arab	League	and	the	GCC	are	still	playing	a	role	in	regional	politics.	See,	for	example,	Phillips	(2014).	6	In	this	paper	we	do	not	analyse	in	detail	the	case	of	the	Maronite	Christian	community,	given	the	low	weight	that	 its	 recent	 transformations,	 in	 terms	 of	 considerable	 marginalization,	 wield	 for	 the	 regional	 context.	However,	 where	 necessary,	 references	 to	 the	 trajectory	 of	 this	 community	 will	 be	made,	 in	 particular	 for	 its	position	with	respect	to	domestic	politics	and	the	other	communities.	7	 This	 is	 the	 name	 of	 the	 political	 system	 of	 Lebanon	whose	 origins	 can	 be	 found	 in	 Lijparth’s	model,	 which	foresees	proportional	repartition	of	the	power	among	the	different	communities	(Lijparth,	1969).	In	Lebanon	in	particular,	the	prime	minister	has	to	be	a	Sunni,	the	president	of	the	Republic	a	Maronite	and	the	president	of	the	Parliament	a	Shiite.		
  
different	 communities,	 thereby	 giving	 credit	 to	 the	meta-narrative	 of	 sectarianism	 that	 has	been	amplified	by	the	media.8	This	reading	of	Lebanese	politics	seems	to	create	new	and	less	manageable	sectarian	tensions,	and	it	is	clear	that	these	adverse	changes	are	a	clear	legacy	of	the	“sectarian	pan-Islamist”	meta-narrative	that	is	emerging	at	the	regional	level.		2.	Should	Lebanese	confessionalism	be	re-considered	in	the	light	of	the	Arab	uprisings?		Lebanon	 is	 one	of	 the	most	 interesting	 countries	 to	 observe	 as	 regards	 the	diffusion	of	 the	narrative	 of	 the	 fracture	 between	 Sunnis	 and	 Shiites.	 The	 “country	 of	 the	 Cedars”	 is	 a	kaleidoscope	 of	 the	 confessional	 diversity	 that	 characterizes	 this	 region,	 which	 can	 be	observed	 in	 countries	 such	as	 Syria	 and	 Iraq.	 In	Lebanon,	however,	 the	division	of	political	power	along	sectarian	lines	has	granted	certain	stability	to	the	system	(except	during	the	civil	war),	due	to	the	power-sharing	formula	(Fakhoury	2009;	Di	Peri	2010).	 In	Syria,	 the	power	was	managed	 by	 the	 Asad	 family	 and	 by	 the	 Alawite	 elites	 around	 them	 (van	 Dam	 1979),	according	 to	 a	 neo-patrimonial	model	 that	 ensured	monarchical	 succession	 in	 a	 republican	state	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 Syria	 has	 been	 defined	 a	 “presidential	 monarchy”.9	 If	 Lebanon’s	economic	 system	 espoused	 a	 neoliberal	 vision,	 also	 as	 a	 result	 of	 a	 laissez-faire	 policy	developed	post-independence	(Gates	1998)10,	in	Syria	as	well	as	in	Iraq,	economic	power	has	long	since	been	established	by	a	centralized	economic	policy	(Aita	2007;	al-Ahsan	1984);	only	in	 recent	 times	 has	 centralization	 been	 leading	 the	 way	 to	 the	 privatization	 of	 certain	sectors.11	 Finally,	 while	 Lebanon	 has	 played	 a	 key	 yet	 indirect	 role	 in	 Middle	 Eastern	 and	international	 relations,	at	different	stages,	Syria	and	 Iraq	have	sought	 to	gain	an	hegemonic	role	as	regional	power,	contending	with	Egypt	(or	with	Saudi	Arabia)	while	also	playing	the	pan-Arabism	card	(Gause	2007).		 The	 different	 trajectory	 that	 Lebanon	 has	 experienced	 over	 the	 years,	 compared	 to	other	 countries	 in	 the	 region	 characterized	 by	 multi-confessionalism	 led	 to	 the	 fact	 that	communities	 in	 Lebanon	 played	 an	 important	 role	 in	 the	 building	 of	 the	 Lebanese	 state,	becoming	 the	 mainstay	 of	 the	 country’s	 political	 and	 administrative	 management	 (Rondot	1989).	However,	since	the	end	of	the	civil	war,	and	more	distinctly	after	the	war	with	Israel	in	2006,	a	series	of	important	changes	within	each	community	began	to	emerge	showing	at	least	two	elements:	on	 the	one	hand	 that,	now	as	 in	 the	past,	 the	Lebanese	 communities	are	not	immune	 to	 external	 events	 and	 actors,	 yet	 they	 operate	 in	 a	 regional	 context	 strongly	permeated	 by	 instability,	 and	 that,	 in	 this	 context,	 there	 is	 a	 mutual	 exchange	 between	internal	and	external	in	terms	of	alliances	and	patronage	links;	on	the	other	hand	that,	despite	the	 obvious	 sectarian	 splits,	 however,	 Lebanese	 communities	 demonstrate	 a	 certain	pragmatism	that	affects	both	the	alliances	within	the	country	and	those	that	each	community	develops	 externally.12	 In	 the	 following	 pages,	 these	 two	 points	 will	 be	 explained	 through	analysis	of	the	trajectories	of	the	Shiites	and	Sunni	communities.	These	cases	will	be	observed	in	 relation	 to	 the	 national	 context	 and	 their	 transnational	 dimension,	 thus	 linking	 the	Lebanese	case	with	the	re-positioning	of	various	Middle	Eastern	countries	in	the	wake	of	the	Arab	protests.																																																									8	See,	 for	example,	 the	titles	of	some	news	agencies	or	commentaries	on	the	Lebanese	situation	between	2012	and	2013,	 	 	 Foreign	Policy	Association,	 in	particular	http://goo.gl/vchM3z/	Last	 accessed	8	 July	2014;	Wilson	Center	 	 	 http://goo.gl/SBYd50	 Last	 accessed	 8	 July	 2014;	 Jerusalem	 Center	 for	 Public	 Affairs		http://goo.gl/FKqxSm	Last	accessed	8	 July	2014;	The	Middle	East	Time	http://goo.gl/DqNlM3	Last	accessed	8	July	2014.	See	also	al-Qaraḍāwī	and	al-Šahal	declarations:	http://goo.gl/CxzoeR	Last	accessed	8	July	2014.	9	This	term	appears	in	Hinnebusch	(2001,	p.	67	and	following).	10	See	also	the	paper	of	George	Corm	in	this	special	issue.	11	 On	 the	 complex	 process	 of	 economic	 liberalization,	 as	 a	 result	 of	 internal	 power	 reorganization	 but	 also	regional	and	international	factors,	see	Perthes	(1994).	12	On	this	specific	point	see	also	the	argumentation	of	Lorenzo	Trombetta	in	this	special	issue.	
  
	An	earthquake	in	Lebanese	politics:	the	rise	of	Ḥizb	Allāh	and	the	transformation	of	the	Shiite	community			Since	the	end	of	the	civil	war,	the	Lebanese	Shiite	community	has	undoubtedly	received	more	attention	from	analysts,	scholars	and	the	media.	The	arrival	on	the	Lebanese	political	scene	of	Ḥizb	 Allāh	 and,	 more	 generally,	 the	 rise	 and	 consolidation	 of	 the	 Shiite	 community	 have	greatly	 contributed	 towards	 changing	 the	 sectarian	 balance,	 having	 a	 major	 impact	 both	internally	and	externally.13	If	the	Shiite	community	in	Lebanon	was	the	“great”	excluded	from	the	 National	 Pact	 of	 1943-	 and	 especially	 from	 the	 new	 configuration	 of	 institutional	arrangements	 provided	 for	 by	 the	 al-Ṭāʾif	 agreements-	 the	 end	 of	 the	 civil	 war	 certainly	marked	an	important	step	forward	for	the	internal	accreditation	of	this	community.	Whereby,	in	 the	course	of	 the	Seventies	and	then	the	Eighties,	 the	 landmark	 for	 the	Shiite	community	was	the	Amal	movement,	then	the	official	creation	of	Ḥizb	Allāh	(in	1985)	contributed	greatly	to	the	resizing	of	Amal,	paving	the	way	for	its	rapid	affirmation	as	one	of	the	most	important	political	 actors	 on	 the	 Lebanese	 political	 scene	 (Abukhalil	 1990).14	 More	 than	 the	 other	parties	 in	Lebanon,	the	“Party	of	God”	was	more	able	to	adapt	to	the	profound	changes	that	the	Lebanese	society	had	to	face	up	to	after	the	civil	war	(Alagha	2006;	Hamzeh	1993).	On	the	one	hand,	Ḥizb	Allāh	provided	a	voice	for	the	dispossessed,	carrying	on	the	legacy	of	Mūsā	al-Ṣadr	and	building	a	welfare	network	for	the	poor	(as	well	as	 for	martyrs’	 families)	that	will	endow	it	with	legitimacy	nationwide	(Flanigan	2009).	On	the	other	hand,	Ḥizb	Allāh,	over	the	years,	 and	 especially	 in	 the	 2000s,	was	 able	 to	 attract,	 centred	 around	 a	 pan-Arab	 project,	namely	 the	common	struggle	of	 the	Arabs	against	 the	State	of	 Israel,	a	number	of	countries	and	 movements	 in	 the	 region,	 not	 necessarily	 Shiites	 (Ḥamās,	 for	 example,	 and	 more	generally	 the	Muslim	Brotherhood)	(Schenker	2013;	Campanini	2012).	 Its	ability	 to	play	on	two	 different	 levels,	 depending	 on	 the	 “systems”,	 showed	 the	 extreme	 adaptability	 and	pragmatism	of	 the	party	(Di	Peri	2014a).	This	 flexibility	has	been	particularly	evident	since	1992,	when,	after	some	hesitation	and	strong	internal	discussions,	Ḥizb	Allāh	finally	accepted	the	 al-Ṭāʾif	 Agreement	 and	made	 the	 decision	 to	 run	 in	 the	 political	 elections,	 winning	 an	increasing	number	of	parliamentary	 seats.15	The	gradual	modification	of	 the	 strategy	of	 the	party	at	the	domestic	level	and	its	unerring	commitment	to	building	the	“society	of	resistance”	did	not	prevent	Ḥizb	Allāh	from	maintaining	a	strongly	militant	external	stance,	establishing	the	party’s	 inclusion	on	 terrorist	organization	 lists	 as	well	 as	 international	 stigmatization.16	This	position,	marked	by	the	struggle	against	the	West,	the	capitalist	system	and	Israel,	was	clearly	apparent	from	the	beginning,	as	evidenced	by	the	party’s	programmatic	document,	the	Open	 Letter.17	 Equally,	 it	 is	 undeniable	 that	 this	 stance	 has	 also	 been	 fuelled	 by	 the	 two	countries	 that	 had	 contributed	 the	most	 to	 the	 emergence	 and	 development	 of	 Ḥizb	 Allāh,	namely	 Iran	 and	 Syria.	 It	 should	 be	 noted,	 however,	 that,	 in	 spite	 of	 the	 rhetoric,	 Syrian	support	to	the	Lebanese	Shiites	groups	did	not	fit	within	a	regional	policy	characterized	by	the	Shiite-Sunni	divide	(praised	nationally),	but	rather	by	a	more	pragmatic	attitude,	 that	 is	 the	
																																																								13	Although	there	are	no	data	to	attest	it,	 in	the	Seventies	the	Shiite	community	became,	as	far	as	population	is	concerned,	 the	most	populous	Muslim	community	 in	Lebanon.	Domestically,	 this	clearly	contributes	 to	a	more	demanding	 role	 of	 the	 Shiite	 community	 in	 the	 consociational	 Lebanese	 system,	 whereas,	 externally,	 it	contributes	towards	redefining	strategic	alliances.		14	 It	 is	 obviously	wrong	 to	 reduce	 the	 Shiite	 community	 to	 Amal	 and	Ḥizb	 Allāh.	Many	 other	 relevant	 Shiites	families	had	and	have	a	relevant	role	in	Lebanese	politics.	Chorev	(2013,	316-319).			15	For	example,	the	expulsion	of	Ṣubḥī	al-Ṭufaylī,	Ḥizb	Allāh’s	first	Secretary-General.	He	strongly	criticized	Ḥizb	Allāh’s	changing	attitude	towards	the	Lebanese	political	system.		16	Both	in	the	U.S.	as,	in	2013,	in	Europe.	See	Azani	(2006)	and	Birnbaum	and	Eglash	(2013).	17	The	text	of	the	Open	Letter	is	reported	in	Norton	(1987,	167-87).	
  
identification	of	the	most	promising	community	in	Lebanon	for	its	accreditation	as	hegemonic	actor	at	the	regional	level	(Di	Peri	2014).	From	the	point	of	view	of	Ḥizb	Allāh,	if,	over	the	years,	pragmatism	has	prevailed	at	the	domestic	 level,	 a	more	militant	 attitude	 has	 emerged	 at	 the	 regional	 level,	which,	 until	 the	outbreak	of	the	Arab	revolts,	relied	on	two	important	elements:	the	claim	to	credit	itself	as	a	pan-Arab	party	 open	 to	 all	 communities	 and	 representative	 of	 the	umma	and	 the	 ability	 to	leverage	this	militant	position	to	justify	the	party’s	domestic	policy	choices	as	well	as	seeking	to	placate	 the	 Shiite	hard	 core	 (the	basis	 of	 the	party)	 and	 the	 trans-confessional	 alliances,	such	as	the	alliance	with	Christian	Michel	ʿAwn.	This	double	track	and	the	ability	of	Ḥizb	Allāh	to	 introduce	 and	 establish	 itself	 as	 a	 new	 force	 on	 the	 opaque	 and	 stale	 Lebanese	 political	scene	(thanks	also	to	the	media	apparatus18	that	Ḥizb	Allāh	has	built	over	the	years	as	well	as	due	 to	 its	 efforts	 at	 the	 local	 level)	 have	 in	 some	way	 contributed	 towards	 dampening	 the	critical	 elements	 from	 within,	 from	 the	 Sunni	 community	 (in	 particular	 by	 Saʿd	 Ḥarīrī	especially	 after	 the	 assassination	 of	 his	 father	 Rafīq	 and	 the	 creation	 of	 the	 International	Commission	of	 Inquiry)19	and	 from	 the	Maronite	 community	 (especially	beginning	with	 the	33-day	war	of	2006).20	The	war	against	 Israel	 in	2006	proved	a	watershed	 for	Lebanon	but	 for	Ḥizb	Allāh,	 too.	Despite	 the	 “divine	victory”	 against	 the	 Israel	Defense	Forces	 (IDF),	Ḥizb	Allāh	began	 to	be	criticized	domestically,	 for	being	responsible	 for	 the	war	and	 the	consequent	destruction	of	the	country,	as	well	as	internationally,	for	its	dependence	on	Syria	and	Iran,	which	would	have	used	 Lebanon	 as	 a	 proxy	 to	 conduct	 their	 struggles	 against	 Israel.21	 The	 accreditation	 as	 a	champion	of	the	fight	against	Zionism,	neo-liberalism	and	capitalist	exploitation,	also	through	participation	in	anti-globalization	conferences	(Karagiannis	2009),	and	the	good	management	skills	 acquired	 at	 the	 administrative	 level	 (Harb	 2009),	 enabled	 the	 party	 to	 accumulate	political	capital	that	could	be	exploited	within	Lebanon.	However,	after	the	war	of	2006	and	the	 events	 of	 the	 spring	 of	 2008,	 a	 new	 perception	 of	 the	 “Party	 of	 God”	 was	 established,	which	had,	as	a	common	matrix,	growing	hostility	towards	it	by	a	large	part	of	the	population	as	well	as	polarization	of	 the	sectarian	positions.	 In	May	2008,	 the	decision	taken	by	the	al-Sanyūrah	government	to	authorize	an	investigation	into	Ḥizb	Allāh’s	phone	network,	resulting	in	the	removal	of	the	head	of	the	security	at	Beirut	International	Airport	(a	man	close	to	the	“Party	of	God”),	led	to	a	violent	reaction	by	Ḥizb	Allāh.	For	the	first	time	since	the	end	of	the	civil	war,	the	country	was	shaken	by	two	weeks	of	armed	clashes	between	the	“Party	of	God”	and	the	Lebanese	army,	which	only	came	to	an	end	through	foreign	diplomatic	efforts	(Worth	and	Bakri	2008).	Neither	the	long-standing	alliance	with	Christian	Michel	ʿAwn	helped	Ḥizb	Allāh	to	regain	credibility	at	a	national	level.	It	can	therefore	be	affirmed	that	Ḥizb	Allāh’s	adaptability	and	its	ability	to	use	the	international	and	regional	context	for	its	domestic	accreditation	have	been	questioned	 to	 such	 an	 extent	 that,	 in	 2009,	 Ḥizb	 Allāh	 published	 its	 new	 Manifesto:	 a	document	explaining	its	new	stance	at	the	domestic,	regional	and	international	levels	(Di	Peri	2014a).	 It	can	be	maintained	that	this	new	document	 is	also	an	attempt	to	show	the	party’s	moderate	politics	worldwide	and	to	regain	credibility	at	the	domestic	level.	In	actual	fact,	 in	the	 Manifesto	 some	 harsh	 stances	 contained	 in	 the	 Open	 Letter	 disappear	 and	 a	 more	pragmatic	attitude	prevails	(Alagha	2011).				The	war	in	Syria	and	its	consequences	for	Lebanon	are	reinforcing	Ḥizb	Allāh’s	inability	to	continue	 to	 juggle	 the	 two	positions	(moderation	domestically	and	militancy	externally)	 for	two	main	 reasons:	 firstly,	 because	 the	 older	 external	 supporters	 of	 the	 “Party	 of	 God”	 are																																																									18	See	Lamloum	(2009)	and	Koch	(2008).	19	Khashan	(2011).	20	Interview	by	the	author	with	a	Maronite,	Beirut,	February	2010.	21	Informal	talks	by	the	author	in	Tyre,	January-February	2012;	see	also	Gambill	and	Abdelnour	(2002).	
  
strongly	challenged	by	the	international	community.	Both	Asad	in	Syria	and	Ḫāmeneī	in	Iran	are	 showing	profound	weaknesses	 in	 terms	 of	 accreditation	 as	 regional	 leaders.	 Syria	 does	not	seem	credible	given	 the	annihilation	policy	of	a	 large	part	of	 its	population.	 Iran,	which	had	 hailed	 and	 supported	 the	 Arab	 uprisings	 as	 a	 continuation	 of	 the	 1979	 Iranian	Revolution,22	to	promote	itself	as	a	regional	champion,	has	objective	difficulties	in	sustaining	its	position	considering	 the	current	 situation	marked	by	 increasing	 tension	between	Sunnis	and	Shiites.	Secondly,	because,	given	Ḥizb	Allāh’s	unconditional	support	of	Asad,	the	“Party	of	God’s”	strategy	of	acting	as	a	representative	for	all	Lebanese	(and,	more	broadly,	for	all	Arabs)	is	gradually	crumbling,	consequently	increasing	the	anti-Shiite	rhetoric	in	Lebanon	within	the	Sunni	 (as	 well	 as	 the	 Christian)	 community	 and	 causing	 further	 confessional	 splits	 with	tangible	 (and	 not	 just	 political)	 consequences	 on	 the	 ground	 (clashes	 in	 Tripoli	 and	 Sidon	disorder).23	It	 should	be	noted,	however,	 that	 the	official	declarations	by	Ḥizb	Allāh	on	 these	 issues	continue	to	be	highly	pragmatic,	focusing	on	the	moderation	of	positions	at	the	domestic	level	(Lakkis	2013).	The	point	is	until	when	and	how	the	“Party	of	God”	will	continue	to	keep	the	internal	 and	 external	 stance	 separate	 given	 the	 developments	 on	 the	 ground	 in	 the	 whole	region,	 the	 increasingly	 difficult	 situation	 in	 Syria	 and	 its	 repercussion	 on	 Lebanon	 (Ward	2013).		4.The	 difficult	 management	 of	 political	 heritage:	 the	 evolution	 of	 the	 Sunni	 community	 in	Lebanon			The	Sunni	community	has	played	a	vital	role	in	the	“country	of	the	Cedars”.	Since	the	creation	of	 Greater	 Lebanon	 in	 1920,	 when	 Lebanon	 experienced	 the	 inclusion	 of	 new	 territories,	mostly	 inhabited	 by	 Shiites	 and	 Sunni	 populations	 (Di	 Peri	 2009),	 the	 political	 and	demographic	weight	 of	 the	 Sunni	 community	began	 to	 grow	along	with	 the	 leverage	of	 the	Christian-Maronites.	 Each	 community	 had	 its	 own	 vision	 of	 Lebanon.	Whereas,	 at	 first,	 the	Maronites	would	have	frowned	upon	the	creation	of	a	Maronite	state	in	Lebanon,	in	the	1926	Constitution	 this	prerogative	was	omitted,	promoting	 instead	 the	narrative	of	a	 future	state	for	 all	 Lebanese	 regardless	 of	 confessional	 appurtenance	 (Zamir	 1985).	 The	 Sunnis,	 on	 the	other	hand,	while	 initially	 they	would	have	preferred	Lebanon	to	have	been	part	of	a	wider	pan-Arab	 project,	 perhaps	 assuming	 its	 union	 with	 Syria,	 gradually,	 while	 defending	 the	“Arabness”	of	the	country,	shifted	to	a	more	accommodating	position.	At	the	forefront	of	such	thinking	 were	 the	 Sunni	 elite	 in	 Beirut,	 represented	 by	 the	 emblematic	 figure	 of	 Riyāḍ	 al-Ṣulḥ.24	Gradual	accommodation	and,	above	all,	the	prospect	of	political	and	economic	benefits	for	 both	 sides	 led	 to	 the	 creation,	 in	 1943,	 of	 the	 National	 Pact,	 an	 unwritten	 accord	 that	guaranteed	a	power-sharing	agreement	between	the	two	major	communities	on	the	basis	of	their	confessional	weight.	The	Sunni	community	had,	 from	the	outset,	great	significance	not	only	in	the	institutional	arrangements	that	led	to	the	creation	of	the	Lebanese	consociational	system,	but	also	in	the	political	life	of	the	country,	as	evidenced	by	the	considerable	power	of	certain	Sunni	prime	ministers	during	the	period	of	the	First	Republic	(1943-75).		 	After	 the	 end	 of	 the	 civil	 war,	 a	 new	 founding	 pact,	 the	 al-Ṭāʾif	 Agreement,	 further	legitimated	the	importance	of	the	Sunni	community	through	its	equivalence	to	the	Maronite	community	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 the	 Shiites.	 The	 pre-eminence	 of	 the	 Sunni	 community,	 even																																																									22	“We	do	not	distinguish	among	Gaza,	Palestine,	Tunisia,	Libya,	Egypt,	Bahrain	and	Yemen.	We	have	supported	Palestine	for	thirty-two	years,	and	they	are	not	Šīʿa.	It	is	not	an	issue	of	Šīʿa	or	Sunni.	It	is	the	protest	of	a	nation	against	oppression”.	Ḫāmeneī	declaration,	Nawrūz	Message,	Reported	in	Abdo,	1,	2013.	23	Informal	talk	by	the	author	in	Sidon	and	Tyre	in	2012.	See	also	the	paper	of	Daniel	Meier	in	this	special	issue.	24	Riyāḍ	al-Ṣulḥ	was	one	of	the	most	prominent	Lebanese	political	men,	promoter	of	the	Lebanese	independence	and	of	the	National	Pact.	See	El	Khazen	(1991).	
  
after	 political	 marginalization	 (in	 population	 terms,	 too),	 over	 the	 Maronite	 one	 in	 the	aftermath	 of	 the	 civil	 war,	 had	 as	 a	 witness	 in	 the	 re-foundation	 of	 its	 own	 narrative	 a	controversial	and	charismatic	 figure	who	had	played	a	key	role	 in	 the	reconstruction	of	 the	country,	namely	Rafīq	Ḥarīrī.	A	native	of	Sidon,	a	city	in	southern	Lebanon,	historically	a	Sunni	stronghold,	 Ḥarīrī	 was	 a	 leading	 actor	 in	 Lebanese	 politics	 of	 the	 Nineties	 and	 helped	 to	strengthen	the	idea	of	a	“lay”	Sunnism	with	a	strong	entrepreneurial	mindset.	Ḥarīrī’s	idea	of	Sunnism,	linked	with	modernity	and	progress,	used	the	same	buzzwords	that	Ḥarīrī	had	used	to	present	his	pharaonic	projects	for	the	reconstruction	of	the	country	through	his	company,	SOLIDERE.25	The	presentation	of	himself	as	the	new	man	of	Lebanon	gave	new	visibility	to	the	Sunni	community	who	found	in	Ḥarīrī	a	powerful,	unifying	leader.26	The	Lebanese	system,	which	is	based	on	the	consociational	model	whereby	the	balance	of	all	 the	 components	 of	 society	 is	 fundamental,	 has	 been	 shaken,	 from	 the	 Nineties,	 by	 two	important	 trends:	 the	 increasingly	 open	 clash	 among	 the	 three	 powers	 of	 the	 state,	which,	post	al-Ṭāʾif,	had	been	treated	de	facto	as	the	same	(the	president	of	the	Republic,	the	prime	minister	and	the	president	of	the	parliament,	the	so-called	troika).	This	clash	led	to	a	paralysis	in	decision-making.	The	other	aspect	was	the	increasingly	evident	conflict	between	Ḥarīrī	and	Ḥizb	 Allāh,	 which	 had	 become	 the	 country’s	 leading	 political	 force.	 Furthermore,	 these	fractures	 must	 be	 contextualized	 in	 the	 light	 of	 the	 so-called	 Syrian	 protectorate	 (Kassir	2000).	 From	 the	 end	 of	 the	 civil	war	 until	 the	withdrawal	 of	 its	 troops	 from	 the	 Lebanese	territory,	which	occurred	in	2005,	Syria	played	a	leading	role	in	driving	Lebanese	politics.	The	institutional	 clash	 between	Ḥarīrī	 and	 President	 Laḥūd,	 avowedly	 pro-Syrian,	 and	 between	Ḥarīrī	and	Ḥizb	Allāh,	openly	supported	by	Syria,	was	consumed	in	the	shadow	of	the	Syrian	aegis	over	Lebanon.	While	 taking	 into	 account	 these	 dynamics,	 attention	 must	 also	 be	 paid	 to	 the	 events	following	the	assassination	of	Rafīq	Ḥarīrī	in	February	2005.	A	wave	of	outrage	at	the	murder	of	 the	 former	Prime	Minister,	 for	which	Syria	and	 its	 ally	Ḥizb	Allāh	were	accused,	 led	 to	a	polarization	of	 the	political	 positions	within	 the	 confessional	 spectrum,	which	 resulted	 in	 a	radicalization	of	the	conflict	between	the	Sunni	political	parties	aggregates	around	the	March	14	 coalition	 and	 Ḥizb	 Allāh	 with	 its	 March	 8	 coalition,	 in	 particular	 on	 two	 controversial	issues:	 the	 disarmament	 of	 Ḥizb	 Allāh	 (as	 required	 by	 the	 al-Ṭāʾif	 Agreement	 and	 never	accomplished)	 and	 the	 initial	 investigation	 into	 the	 assassination	 of	 Rafīq	 Ḥarīrī.27	 For	 the	first	time	in	its	history,	the	Sunni	community	felt	orphaned,	abandoned	and	marginalized	by	its	 politicians	 who	 were	 murdered	 (not	 just	 Ḥarīrī,	 as,	 in	 2005,	 there	 were	 a	 series	 of	assassinations	of	anti-Syrian	politicians	and	 journalists)	and	 their	political	weight	gradually	decreased.	This	perception	is	an	important	factor	to	be	taken	into	account,	considering	that,	historically,	it	was	the	Shiites	who	were	the	discriminated	and	persecuted	minority,	not	only	in	Lebanon	but	throughout	the	Middle	East.	This	is	also	the	reason	why	the	Sunni	community	has	strengthened	itself	around	the	Sunni	al-Mustaqbal	party	led,	after	the	dead	of	Rafīq	Ḥarīrī,	by	his	son	and	successor	Saʿd	(Vloeberghs	2012).	
																																																								25	Ḥarīrī	was	 prime	minister	 from	1992	 to	 1998	 and	 from	2000	 to	 2004.	 A	 highly	 controversial	 figure	 in	 the	Lebanese	political	sphere,	his	politics	have	been	defined	as	authoritarian	modernization.	Ḥarīrī	had	strong	ties	with	Saudi	Arabia	a	country	where	he	lived	for	many	years	before	come	back	to	Lebanon.	See	Naba	(1999).	26	This,	of	course,	not	without	controversy:	Ḥarīrī	brought	forward	an	operation	of	“sunnization”,	which	resulted	in	the	exclusion,	cooptation	or	neutralization	of	other	Sunni	politicians	in	the	country.		27	Two	political	coalitions	came	to	light	in	the	aftermath	of	Ḥarīrī’s	assassination:	the	first,	the	so-called	March	8	(the	date	of	the	event	convened	by	Ḥizb	Allāh	as	a	spontaneous	reaction	to	what	took	place	at	Ḥarīrī’s	funeral),	which	gathered	around	the	“Party	of	God”,	Amal	and	the	Christian	party	of	Michel	ʿAwn;	the	second,	the	so-called	March	14,	from	the	date	of	the	counter-demonstration	organized	by	the	opposing	forces,	gathered	around	the	al-Mustaqbal	party,	which	included	the	Sunni	forces	but	also	those	of	the	Christian	Lebanese	Forces	of	Samīr	Ǧaʿǧaʿ	and	the	Druze	Progressive	Socialist	Party	of	Walīd	Ǧumblāṭ,	who	left	the	coalition	in	2011.	
  
The	 polarization	 of	 the	 positions	 of	 the	 political	 forces	 regarding	 Ḥarīrī’s	 murder	investigation	saw	the	option	put	forward	by	the	14	March	coalition	prevail,	which	called	for	an	 international	 resolution,	 opposed	 to	 Ḥizb	 Allāh’s	 alternative,	 which	 called	 for	 the	settlement	of	the	dispute	“within”	the	country.	The	Security	Council	Resolution	1595	of	2005	had	resulted	in	the	creation	of	an	International	Commission	of	Inquiry	(Cataleta	2012),	whose	work,	which	led	to	the	arrest	of	some	members	of	the	Syrian	intelligence,	was	interrupted	by	the	Israeli	invasion	of	Lebanon	in	2006.	It	was	within	this	context	that,	on	30	May	2007,	with	Resolution	1757	of	 the	Security	Council,	 the	Special	Tribunal	 for	Lebanon	(STL)	was	set	up,	becoming	operational	 in	2009.	The	beginning	of	 the	STL’s	work	was	preceded	by	the	“2008	events,”	which	were	 fuelled	by	several	 factors:	 the	clash	between	the	 two	coalitions	around	the	 STL	 as	 well	 as	 their	 different	 stances	 regarding	 the	 Israeli	 invasion,	 which	 led,	 in	November	2006,	 to	 the	resignation	of	 the	Shiite	ministers	 from	the	al-Sanyūra	government;	the	end	of	the	term	of	President	Emile	Laḥūd,	already	renewed	by	special	law	in	2004,	which	led	 to	 an	 eighteen-month	 power	 vacuum;	 and	 the	 clashes	 in	 the	 refugee	 camp	 of	 Nahr	 al-Bārid.28		The	“2008	events”	testify	the	return	to	the	communitarian	option,	and	the	transposition	of	the	political	struggle	on	the	grounds	of	sectarian	strife	seemed	to	plunge	the	country	back	to	 the	 civil	war	 period.	After	 exhausting	mediation,	 promoted	 from	 the	 outside,	 the	 parties	were	 able	 to	 find	 a	 semblance	 of	 unity	 on	 a	 new	 confessional	 compromise,	 the	 Doha	Agreement	(21	May	2008).	The	compromise	unlocked	the	impasse	that	had	lasted	for	months,	leading	to	the	election	of	Michel	Suleiman	as	President	of	the	Republic	on	23	May,	a	revision	of	the	electoral	law	(passed	in	September)	and	the	launch	of	a	new	political	economy.29		However,	following	allegations	by	the	STL	levelled	at	the	“Party	of	God”,	considered	one	of	the	masterminds	of	the	assassination	of	Ḥarīrī,	at	the	beginning	of	2011,	the	political	tension	that	had	been	kept	painstakingly	under	control	in	previous	years	became	evident	once	more	and	Ḥizb	Allāh	withdrew	eleven	of	 its	ministers	from	Saʿd	Ḥarīrī’s	government,	causing	it	to	fall.	The	appointment	of	Naǧīb	Mīqātī,	a	Sunni	businessman	originally	from	Tripoli,	as	Prime	Minister	did	not	appease	the	controversy,	since	his	candidacy	was	put	forward	by	Ḥizb	Allāh	and	its	allies,	Michel	ʿAwn	and	Walīd	Ǧumblāṭ.	Protests	erupted	across	the	country	on	the	“day	of	 rage”	 (25	 January	 2011).30	 After	 five	 months	 of	 negotiations,	 on	 13	 June	 2011,	 Mīqātī	became	 the	 Prime	Minister	 of	 Lebanon.	 These	 events	 reinforced	 a	 sense	 of	 alienation	 and	powerlessness	within	the	Sunni	community,	which	played	an	important	role	 in	allowing	the	growth	of	 radical	Sunni	movements	with	a	strong	anti-Ḥizb	Allāh	stance	and,	 in	general,	 an	anti-Shiite	rhetoric.31	The	political	difficulties	of	the	March	14	coalition	led	by	Saʿd	Ḥarīrī,	 in	particular	due	to	the	lack	of	a	clear	political	strategy,	encouraged	the	party,	albeit	in	the	shadows,	to	seek	the	support	of	Sunni	conservative	groups,	with	varying	degrees	of	radicalism,	which	might	prove	a	 useful	 tool	 to	 revive	 the	 coalition’s	 basis.32	 In	 this	 context,	 one	 of	 the	 elements	 that																																																									28	The	Fataḥ	al-Islām	movement,	led	by	Šayḫ	Šākir	al-ʿAbsī,	with	its	basis	in	the	Palestinian	refugee	camp	of	Nahr	al-Bārid	on	the	outskirts	of	Tripoli,	was	severely	attacked	by	the	Lebanese	army,	under	the	pretext	of	pursuing	an	officer	responsible	for	a	bank	robbery	in	Tripoli.	After	months	of	siege,	affiliates	to	the	group	were	dispersed	and	al-ʿAbsī	disappeared,	only	to	be	killed	a	year	later	by	Syrian	security	forces.	See	ICG	(2012).		29	In	this	context,	we	should	also	look	at	the	memorandum	of	understanding	signed	the	same	year	between	Ḥizb	Allāh	 and	 the	 Lebanese	 Salafi	 movement	 led	 by	 Šayḫ	 Šahal	 to	 promote	 a	 renewed	 agreement	 between	 the	Lebanese	Islamist	 forces	to	guarantee	national	unity.	This	memorandum,	however,	was	suspended	indefinitely	from	 Šahal,	 the	 day	 after	 his	 signature.	 See	 Salafis	 freeze	 memorandum	 of	 understanding	 with	 Hezbollah,	Yalibnan,	19	August	2008	(http://goo.gl/mqAbRH).	30	See	Lebanon	protests	turns	violent,	al	Jazeera,	25	January	2011	(http://goo.gl/60h5Jy).	31	Interview	by	the	author	with	a	Maronite	representative	in	Sidon,	February	2012.	32	Saʿd	Ḥarīrī	obviously	did	not	intend	to	alienate	the	non-Sunni	allies	in	the	coalition	and,	at	the	same	time,	he	was	 afraid	 to	 disappoint	 the	 expectations	 and	 consequent	 support	 of	Western	 countries,	 publicly	 making	 an	
  
necessitates	emphasis	is	the	high	fragmentation	that	the	Sunni	community	was	forced	to	face	in	the	last	decade:	while	many	Sunnis	support	the	14	March	coalition,	others	have	“migrated”	to	 Ḥizb	 Allāh	 (deemed	 the	 only	 political	 actor	 capable	 of	 fighting	 the	 corruption	 of	 the	Lebanese	political	 system	and	 the	 last	bastion	of	 resistance	against	 Israel),	and	others	have	joined	radical	Islamic	groups	with	a	clear	anti-system,	and	often	anti-Shiite,	attitude.		The	problems	within	the	Lebanese	Sunni	community	were	amplified	at	the	regional	level.	Since	Rafīq	Ḥarīrī’s	commitment	to	Lebanese	politics,	ties	between	the	Sunni	community	and	Saudi	Arabia	have	become	very	close.	In	general,	Lebanese	Sunnis	have	espoused	a	neoliberal	economic	policy	that	has	brought	them	closer	to	the	West.33	The	political	and	economic	woes	of	 the	 Ḥarīrī	 family	 after	 Rafīq	 Ḥarīrī	 assassination	 irritated	 Riyadh,	 however,	 and	 the	turbulent	regional	context	that	emerged	from	the	Arab	uprisings	of	2011	merely	distorted	the	attention	of	the	Saudi	monarchy	from	the	Ḥarīrī	family.	It	should	be	pointed	out,	however,	that,	during	his	mandate,	Saʿd	Ḥarīrī	tried	to	maintain	a	pragmatic	approach	with	his	regional	neighbors;	for	example,	with	a	visit	to	Damascus	in	late	December	2009,	and	through	his	marriage	to	a	woman	from	a	prestigious	Syrian	family.34	Saʿd	Ḥarīrī’s	 visit	 to	 Damascus	 was	 after	 the	 Saudi	 ambassador’s	 visit,	 who	 affirmed	 that	 “the	steady	communication	and	special	relationship	between	the	custodian	of	the	holy	shrines	and	President	Assad	are	exemplary	for	other	Arab	leaders	to	emulate.	 	 […]	The	fruits	of	 the	two	countries’	distinguished	relations	…	are	reflecting	positively,	especially	in	Iraq	and	Lebanon”	(Khashan	2011).	Nonetheless,	 it	 seems	 apparent	 that	 the	 changed	 domestic	 circumstances,	 with	 the	massive	 influx	 of	 Syrian	 refugees,	 especially	 Sunnis,	 the	 manifest	 support	 of	 the	 Sunni	community	 to	 the	 forces	 of	 opposition	 to	 Asad35	 (and	 to	 some	 radical	 Salafi	 groups	 in	Lebanon),	 and	 the	 lack	 of	 political	 figures	 gathering	 the	 lost	 legacy	 of	 the	 Ḥarīrī	 clan	 are	exacerbating	 the	 problems	 within	 the	 Sunni	 community,	 fragmenting	 them	 further	 and	fuelling	their	feelings	of	dispossession	and	fragility	(Di	Peri	2014b).			Conclusion.	Internal	and	regional	transformations:	bidirectional	spillover	effect?		One	 of	 the	most	 evident	 consequences	 of	 the	Arab	uprisings	 has	 been	 the	 renewed	dignity	that	 was	 given	 to	 national	 policies,	 for	 decades	 crushed	 under	 the	 double-edged	 sword	 of	authoritarianism	and	the	praise	of	such	transnational	ideologies	as	pan-Arabism.	Through	this	view,	we	have	argued	that	observing	the	Lebanese	politics	and	the	changes	in	the	balance	of	power	among	Muslim	communities,	which	were	 those	most	 active	after	 the	end	of	 the	 civil	war,	and	between	them	and	the	outside	world,	could	provide	an	original	lens	through	which	to	interpret	the	continuous	transformations	of	the	regional	order,	almost	exclusively	read	by	the	Sunni-Shiite	divide.		 In	Lebanon,	it	is	evident	that	the	Shi’a	and	Sunni	communities	are	playing	a	key	role	in	the	evolution	of	national	policy.	Given	the	marginalization	of	the	Christian	communities	and	especially	of	 the	Maronites	 in	 the	aftermath	of	 the	al-Ṭāʾif	Agreement,	Muslim	communities	have	acquired	a	central	role	 in	conducting	the	political	game	in	the	“country	of	 the	Cedars”:	the	 Shiites,	 through	Ḥizb	Allāh,	which	has	been	able	 to	 gain	 accreditation	 at	 a	national	 and																																																																																																																																																																																									alliance	with	 the	 radical	 forces.	 About	 connections	 between	 al-Mustaqbal	 and	militant	 Islamist	 groups	 in	 the	north	of	the	country,	see,	among	others,	Fielder	(2007).	33	Given	the	economic	and	political	problems	of	the	Ḥarīrī	family,	Saudi	Arabia	has	become	increasingly	crucial	over	the	years	despite	the	good	relations	of	Saʿd	Ḥarīrī	with	French	and	Sarkozy	in	particular.	34	See	Al	Shorfa	http://goo.gl/rGSq6f		35	However,	 as	Patrick	Seale	 (2012)	pointed	out,	 the	 forces	of	March	14,	 are	perceived	by	 the	Syrian	National	Council	 as	 the	 imperialist	 forces,	 given	 the	 support	 they	 receive	 from	 Saudi	 Arabia	 and	 the	 West,	 and	 in	 a	regional	perspective	without	Assad,	 the	 ties	between	Lebanese	Sunnis	and	Syrian	opposition	 forces	would	be,	ultimately,	very	weak.	
  
regional	 level	 by	 skillfully	 using	 militancy	 and	 pragmatism;	 the	 Sunnis,	 because	 of	 their	historical	 role	 in	 the	 construction	of	 Lebanon	and,	more	 recently,	 due	 to	 the	 success	of	 the	Ḥarīrī	 family.	 It	 is	 also	 clear	 that,	 at	 this	 stage,	 the	 two	 communities	 are	 strongly	projected	outward	 in	 defining	 their	 own	 political	 strategies.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 by	 strengthening	 old	alliances,	like	the	involvement	of	Ḥizb	Allāh	in	Syria	alongside	the	Asad	regime	has	shown,	but	also	 through	 the	 strengthening	 of	 new	bonds	with	 Iran	 (Devore	 2012).	On	 the	 other	 hand,	through	the	new	connections	established	with	Sunni	movements/parties	 in	the	Middle	East,	which	 called	 for	 a	 revival	 or	 re-emergence	 of	 the	 most	 radical	 Sunni	 groups	 in	 Lebanon,	helping	to	strengthen	a	Sunni	axis	that	is	spreading	increasingly	to	a	regional	level	(Omayma	2008).	 The	 Salafist	 groups	 that	 have	 strengthened	 their	 positions	 in	 Tripoli,	 but	 also	 those	that	have	developed	around	the	Šayḫ	al-Asīr	in	the	cities	of	Sidon,	are	examples	that	shift	in	this	direction.36		 	These	changes	within	the	communities	are	nothing	new	in	Lebanon,	however.	Although	the	confessional	clashes	have	been	represented	historically	as	a	fight	between	Christians	and	Muslims,	 and	 the	 civil	 war	 has	 helped	 fuel	 this	 narrative,	 it	 should	 not	 be	 forgotten	 that,	towards	the	final	stages	of	the	civil	war,	bloody	clashes	exploded	between	Sunnis	and	Shiites	(and	between	solely	Shiites)	in	the	“war	of	the	camps”,	which	led	to	Iran’s	intervention	with	sanctions	 against	 their	 co-religionists.37	 It	 should	 also	 be	 pointed	 out	 that	 the	 presence	 of	Salafist	groups	in	Lebanon	cannot	be	linked	solely	to	the	Syrian	crisis;	it	is	a	phenomenon	that	dates	back	 to	 the	Fifties	 (Hamzeh	1997).	What	 is	 clear,	however,	 is	 that	 the	 intervention	of	actors	on	a	 regional	 scale	with	 a	 renewed	political	weight,	 such	as	Qaṭar,	 Saudi	Arabia,	 but	also	the	Muslim	Brotherhood,	have	 led	to	the	radicalization	of	certain	positions	pushing	the	narrative	 of	 sectarianism	 and	 its	 diffusion	 at	 a	 national	 level	 (Norton	 2012).	 The	contraposition	 between	 Saudi	 Arabia	 and	 Iran	 seems	 to	 be	 framed	 within	 the	 precise	dynamics	of	realpolitik	for	the	control	of	the	region,	in	which	sectarianism	is	used	as	the	main	tool	of	this	realpolitik	(Gause	2011,	Rivetti	2014).		Can	 that	 argument	 be	 taken	 and	 re-adapted	 to	 the	 national	 Lebanese	 context?	 Has	sectarianism	been	used	as	a	new	tool	of	realpolitik	in	Lebanon?	Have	regional	developments	influenced	 the	 national	 ones?	 Or	 are	 we	 seeing	 a	 sort	 of	 a	 bidirectional	 spillover	 effect?	Analysis	 of	 the	 main	 transformations	 that	 have	 occurred	 within	 the	 Shi’a	 and	 Sunni	communities	 in	Lebanon	have	demonstrated	 that	 the	country	has	been	strongly	affected	by	the	 evolution	 of	 regional	 relations.	 It	 cannot	 be	 denied	 that	 certain	 polarization	 of	 the	confessional	positions	on	a	 sectarian	basis	 is	 a	 reflection	of	 the	 larger	polarization	of	 these	positions	on	a	regional	scale.	We	have	tried	to	show,	nevertheless,	how	these	transformations	are	 deeply	 rooted	 in	 the	 evolution	 of	 relations	 among	 the	 communities,	 and	 that	 such	communities	have	their	own	historical,	political	and	cultural	national	roots.	Lebanese	politics	is	still	alive	and,	until	now,	also	as	part	of	the	Baʿabdā	Declaration	of	2012	(which	stressed	the	need	of	the	neutralization	of	Lebanon	regarding	the	Syrian	war	and	the	regional	events)38,	the	Lebanese	political	forces	have	tried	to	preserve	Lebanon	from	the	regional	turmoil.	The	policy	of	non-confrontation	has	prevailed	to	date—not	without	difficulties—over	the	narrative	of	the	“sectarian	pan-	Islamism”	that	is	increasingly	looming	over	the	Middle	East	and	over	Lebanon.		
																																																								36	On	this	point	see	especially	Daniel	Meier’s	paper	in	this	special	issue.	37	See,	in	particular	The	War	of	the	Camps	(1986)	and	Picard	(1987).	38	See	the	document	in	General	Assembly	Security	Council,	Baʿabdā	Declaration,	http://goo.gl/v6eO7B.	
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